Homomorphic encryption of linear optics quantum computation on almost arbitrary states of light with asymptotically perfect security by Ouyang, Y et al.
PHYSICAL REVIEW RESEARCH 2, 013332 (2020)
Homomorphic encryption of linear optics quantum computation on almost arbitrary states of light
with asymptotically perfect security
Yingkai Ouyang ,1,2,3,* Si-Hui Tan,2,3,4 Joseph Fitzsimons,2,3,4 and Peter P. Rohde5,6,†
1Department of Physics & Astronomy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S3 7RH, United Kingdom
2Singapore University of Technology and Design, 8 Somapah Road, Singapore 487372
3Centre for Quantum Technologies, National University of Singapore, 3 Science Drive 2, Singapore 117543
4Horizon Quantum Computing, 79 Ayer Rajah Crescent, Singapore 139955
5Centre for Quantum Software & Information (QSI), Faculty of Engineering & Information Technology,
University of Technology Sydney, NSW 2007, Australia
6Hearne Institute for Theoretical Physics and Department of Physics & Astronomy, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803, United States
(Received 16 June 2019; accepted 28 February 2020; published 18 March 2020)
Future quantum computers are likely to be expensive and affordable outright by few, motivating client/server
models for outsourced computation. However, the applications for quantum computing will often involve
sensitive data, and the client would like to keep her data secret, both from eavesdroppers and the server itself.
Homomorphic encryption is an approach for encrypted, outsourced quantum computation, where the client’s
data remains secret, even during execution of the computation. We present a scheme for the homomorphic
encryption of arbitrary quantum states of light with no more than a fixed number of photons, under the evolution
of both passive and adaptive linear optics, the latter of which is universal for quantum computation. The scheme
uses random coherent displacements in phase-space to obfuscate client data. In the limit of large coherent
displacements, the protocol exhibits asymptotically perfect information-theoretic secrecy. The experimental
requirements are modest, and easily implementable using present-day technology.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevResearch.2.013332
I. INTRODUCTION
In the upcoming quantum era, it is to be expected that
client/server models for quantum computing will emerge,
owing to the high expected cost of quantum hardware. This
necessitates the ability for a client (Alice), possessing data she
wants processed, to outsource the computation to a host (Bob),
who possesses the costly quantum computer. In such a model,
security will be a major concern. The types of applications to
which quantum computing will initially be most relevant will
contain sensitive data, whether it be strategically important
information, or valuable intellectual property, or confidential
personal information. This raises the important question of
how Alice can outsource computation of her data such that no
adversary Eve, or even the server Bob, can read her data—she
trusts no one!
Homomorphic encryption is a cryptographic protocol that
achieves this objective. Alice sends encrypted data to Bob,
who processes it in encrypted form, before returning it to
Alice. The essential feature is that computing the data does not
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require first decrypting it—it remains encrypted throughout
the computation, ensuring that even if Bob is compromised,
Alice retains integrity of her data.
Classical homomorphic encryption has only been de-
scribed very recently [1–3], and a number of results for homo-
morphic quantum computation have been described [4–11].
In the case of universal quantum computation, such protocols
require a degree of interaction between Alice and Bob. How-
ever, it was shown in Ref. [4] that under certain restricted,
non-universal models for quantum computation, homomor-
phic encryption may be implemented passively, without any
client/server interaction, and requiring only separable, nonen-
tangling encoding/decoding operations. In that protocol, in
which single photons encode data, random polarization ro-
tations on Alice’s input photonic state obfuscate data from
Bob. Also, in Ref. [8], a similar protocol was presented using
phase-key encoding, whereby random rotations in phase-
space obfuscate Alice’s data, encoded into coherent states.
These two protocols are limited in their security by the fact
that the rotations in phase-/polarisation-space are correlated
across all inputs, thereby limiting the entropy of the encoded
input states, and hence its security. For example, with m
optical modes, polarization-key encoding is only able to hide
O(ln(m)) bits of information, falling far short of our utopian
ideal of perfect information theoretic security (i.e., hiding all
m bits of information in the case of 0 or 1 photons per mode).
The polarization- and phase-key homomorphic encryption
techniques are specific examples of a more general framework
for encryption, whereby the encoding and decoding opera-
2643-1564/2020/2(1)/013332(15) 013332-1 Published by the American Physical Society
OUYANG, TAN, FITZSIMONS, AND ROHDE PHYSICAL REVIEW RESEARCH 2, 013332 (2020)
tions commute with the computation, thereby mitigating the
need for elaborate interactive protocols.
Here we consider an alternate technique that supersedes
both polarization- and phase-key encoding—displacement key
encoding, whereby random coherent displacements obfuscate
optically encoded quantum information. This idea has been
recently explored by Marshall et al. [12], where it was argued
heuristically why the scheme might be secure. Based on ex-
perimental data generated, Marshall et al. numerically showed
that the mutual information between the encrypted and the
unencrypted data can be made small as the variance of the
random displacements increases. This encouraging evidence
suggests that a displacement key encoding might offer perfect
security in the asymptotic limit. However, obtaining analyt-
ical bounds to quantify the security of the scheme has been
recognized to be a challenging issue, yet to be solved.
In this paper, we rigorously obtain explicit bounds on
the security of using a displacement key encoding, thereby
confirming the intuition of Ref. [12]. Moreover, the dis-
placement key encoding improves on the earlier polarization-
and phase-key techniques in two important respects. First,
we demonstrate that by choosing the encoding displacement
operators to be independent on each optical mode and to
follow a Gaussian distribution with an increasing variance,
any pair of encoded codewords will become increasingly close
in trace-distance and thereby increasingly indistinguishable.
Our encoding scheme is a weak information-theoretic security
encryption scheme with secrecy error that is twice of this
maximum trace distance, and this security definition has been
introduced in Ref. [13, definition 5]. We also remark that
the trace-distance metric we use is preferable to the mutual
information used in Ref. [12], because the trace distance
directly quantifies the indistinguishability of quantum states
while the mutual information does not. Second, our technique
is applicable to linear optics computations acting on quantum
states of light with no more than a fixed number of photons.
Constraining quantum states to have no more than a fixed
number of photons is reasonable, because quantum states that
are bounded in energy can always be well approximated by
quantum states that bounded in photon number, given that
sufficiently many photons is considered. This is far more gen-
eral than polarization-key encoding, which applies to single-
photon input states, or phase-key encoding, which applies to
input coherent states.
II. COMMUTATIVE HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
OF PASSIVE LINEAR OPTICS
A linear optics network [14], comprising only beam-
splitters and phase shifters, implements a photon-number-








where â†i is the creation operator for the ith mode, there are m
optical modes, and U is an SU(m) matrix characterising the
linear optics network.
Bob possesses both the hardware and software for imple-
menting the computation (Û ), which Alice would like applied
FIG. 1. General protocol for commuting homomorphic encryp-
tion of optical states under linear optics evolution Û , where Êi (Ê ′i )
are the encoding (decoding) operations, which we require to be
separable.
to her input state (|ψ〉in), yielding the computed output state
(|ψ〉out = Û |ψ〉in).
Before sending her input state to Bob, Alice, who has
limited quantum resources, wishes to encode her input state
using operations separable across all modes, similarly for
decoding, i.e., we rule out entangling gates for Alice. To














to hold, where Êi(k) (Ê ′i (k)) is the encoding (decoding) op-
eration, with key k. Since Alice has limited classical compu-
tational power, she should determine the encoding/decoding
operations efficiently with a classical computer, and imple-
ment these operations efficiently. The model is summarised
in Fig. 1.
The most natural examples of schemes complying with this
model are ones where systems encoding quantum informa-
tion comprise two subsystems: a primary one in which the
computation is taking place; and, a secondary independent
one, which does not directly couple with the primary and
is unaffected by the computational operations. This allows
us to exploit the secondary subsystem (e.g., polarization) to
control the entropy of our codewords, without affecting the
computation in the primary subsystem (e.g., photon number).
III. DISPLACEMENT-KEY ENCODING
Phase-space displacement operations satisfy the required
commutation relation of Eq. (2). The displacement operation
adds coherent amplitude to an optical state, thereby translating
it in phase-space. This process is described by the unitary
displacement operator, given by,
D̂(α) = exp[αâ† − α∗â]. (3)
Displacement operations are easily experimentally imple-
mented using a low-reflectivity beamsplitter and a coherent
state (well approximated by a laser source) [15, Eq. (9.15)],
013332-2
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FIG. 2. Experimental realisation of the displacement operator. A
strong coherent state (|α〉) is incident on an extremely low reflectivity
(r) beamsplitter, where it is mixed with the input state (ρ̂in). The
output state (ρ̂out) is now given by the input state, displaced by
amplitude rα.
of the form








(see Fig. 2). The displacement amplitude is directly propor-
tional to the coherent state amplitude and the beamsplitter
reflectivity. A special case of displaced states are displaced
vacuum states, which are identically coherent states of the
same amplitude, D̂(α)|0〉 = |α〉.
The commutation relation between displacement operators
and linear optics evolution relates the output displacement
amplitudes β = (β1, . . . , βm) to the input displacement am-
plitudes α = (α1, . . . , αm), and is given by
Û D̂(α) = D̂(β )Û , (5)
where D̂(β ) = ⊗mj=1 D̂(β j ), D̂(α) = ⊗mj=1 D̂(β j ), and β re-
lates to α according to the unitary map
β = U · α. (6)
The computation required for Alice to determine her decoding
operations from her encoding operations is simple matrix
multiplication, which is efficiently computable [16]. Thus our
condition on the complexity of encoding/decoding is satisfied.
An input tensor product of displacement operations with
amplitudes α on multiple modes may be be reversed by
applying inverse displacement operations with amplitudes β
at the output, D̂(β )† = D̂(−β ). Specifically,
D̂(−β )Û D̂(α) = Û , (7)
allowing the computation, Û |ψin〉, to be recovered from the
encoded computation, Û D̂(α)|ψin〉, via application of the
inverse of the encoding operation.
Our scheme extends trivially to the case where the server
is asked to perform any Gaussian operation, rather than only
passive linear optical evolution. This is because displacements
similarly commute with squeezing as one can see from
D̂(α)Ŝ(reiθ ) = Ŝ(reiθ )D̂(γ ), (8)
and all Gaussian operations can be expressed as linear-
squeezing-linear evolutions according to the Bloch-Messiah
decomposition [17,18], together with displacements, where
Ŝ(reiθ ) denotes a squeezing operator with r  0, θ ∈ R and
γ = α cosh r + α∗eiθ sinh r.
The decryption circuit that Alice uses is identical in struc-
ture to her encryption operation, and Alice does not need
to able to perform arbitrary linear optical operations that
potentially requires up to m(m − 1)/2 beamsplitters. Rather,
Alice’s decryption circuit on m modes always requires only
m beamsplitters. Because of this, Alice’s decryption circuit
has exactly the same structure as her encryption circuit. Both
the encryption and decryption circuits can then in principle
be implemented using m Mach-Zehnder interferometers, and
such an optical circuit is independent of Bob’s LOQC. To find
out what coherent states to input into the beamsplitters for
the decryption, Alice needs only to know (1) her own secret
encrypting displacements, and (2) the unitary that Bob’s linear
optical circuit implements.
Unlike phase-key or polarization-key encoding, where the
encoding operations applied to each mode must be identical
for the encryption/decryption commutation relation to hold,
for displacements the amplitudes may be chosen indepen-
dently for each mode, while still preserving the desired com-
mutation relation. Intuitively, one would anticipate that the
ability to choose keys independently for each mode would im-
prove security, since the elimination of correlations between
input encoding operations allows the entropy of the encoded
state to be greatly increased, thereby making codewords less
distinguishable.
We examine this protocol in the context of input data
comprising of arbitrary pure quantum states of light with no





λ j | j〉, ρ̂in = |ψin〉〈ψin|, (9)
where | j〉 = 1√
j!
(â†) j |0〉 is a photon-number (Fock) state and
â† is the photonic creation operator, and |ψin〉 has unit norm
so that
∑∞
j=0 |λ j |2 = 1.
We consider states supported on no more than n photons,
because such states can well approximate states of bounded
energy in the following sense.
Lemma 1. Let ρ = ∑ j p j |φ j〉〈φ j | be a density operator
where every |φ j〉 has expected energy at most μ. Let n 
μ. Then there exists a density operator ρ ′ = ∑ j p j |φ′j〉〈φ′j |
where |φ j〉 has at most n photons and expected energy at most
μ for every j, such that
‖ρ − ρ ′‖1  4
√
μ/n + 4μ/n. (10)
One can see that the approximation error becomes small
when n becomes large for fixed μ. The proof of Lemma 1
follows trivially from Lemmas 11 and 12 in the Appendix.
Lemmas 11 and 12 show respectively that the trace-distance
between states can be related to the Euclidean norms, and the
approximation error for pure states can be bounded using a
connection with Markov’s inequality.
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IV. SECURITY PROOF
The main result of our paper is the following theorem,
which implies that our encoding scheme in the limit of large
coherent displacements has weak information-theoretic secu-
rity.
Theorem 1. The trace-distance between arbitrary encrypted












+ 4(n + 1)
)
.
Our scheme thus is a weak information-theoretic security
encryption scheme with secrecy error at most 2ε.
Our proof employs a continuous-variable (CV) represen-
tation for optical states [19]. We omit some intermediate
mathematical steps in the main text, delegating the complete
step-by-step derivation to the Appendix.
Photon-number (Fock) states are related to the x and p
quadrature CVs using Hermite functions [20, Sec. 18.1]. The
Hermite polynomials are defined as






and the corresponding Hermite functions as





These provide the direct relation between discrete variable
(DV) and CV representations of optical states. Most impor-




ψ j (x)|x〉 dx, (13)
where x is a position eigenstate in phase-space. The position
eigenstates form a complete basis, satisfying
〈x1|x2〉 = δ(x1 − x2). (14)












j (x2)|x1〉〈x2| dx1dx2. (15)
Let Alice’s encoding operation be represented by the quan-
tum process Eenc, which applies a random complex-valued
displacement, chosen from a normal distribution with zero
mean and standard deviation σ . Experimentally, σ is bounded
by the energy output of coherent laser sources. An unknown





where μ(α) = e−|α|2/(2σ2 )2πσ 2 is a Gaussian measure and d2α =
d ((α))d ((α)) indicates that the integral is performed over
the real and imaginary parts of α. Then our encrypted state
ρ̂enc = Eenc(ρin ) can be interpreted as a weighted mixture over
all possible displacement amplitudes associated with the en-
tire key-space. Displacing a position eigenstate by α = u + iv
shifts its position by v and appends a phase that depends on
its position, u and v. After performing the integral over the



















× |x1 + u〉〈x2 + u| du dx1 dx2. (17)
The security of the scheme can be quantified using the trace-
distance between any pair of its encrypted inputs. When
the trace-distance between a pair of states in an encryption
scheme approaches zero, the resolution of this pair of states
as perceived by Eve or Bob vanishes. Such a scheme is said
to exhibit weak information-theoretic security [13], and we
proceed to show that our encryption scheme indeed exhibits
such a form of security.
To show that the trace-distance between almost arbitrary
input states with no more than a fixed number of photons
approaches zero as the standard deviation of the random
displacements grows, we require detailed information of every
matrix element 〈a|ρ̂enc|b〉. To get a handle on 〈a|ρ̂enc|b〉, it





i λ j ρ̂i, j . Since 〈a| and |b〉 can be both ex-
pressed in terms of Hermite polynomials in the position basis,
we find that 〈a|ρ̂i, j |b〉 is just an integral of the product of
four Hermite polynomials. To evaluate these integrals, we
recall that any Hermite polynomial Hj (x) can be expressed
as the coefficient of t j in the Gaussian generating function
e−x
2/2+2xt−t2 e−x
2/2 j! [20, Eq. (18.5)]. Hence, 〈a|ρ̂i, j |b〉 may
be evaluated by writing all of the Hermite polynomials in
terms of their Gaussian generating functions, performing the
Gaussian integrals, and then reading off the respective coef-
ficients. In doing so, we find the exact form of 〈a|ρ̂i, j |b〉 in
Lemma 3 of the Appendix. Namely, 〈a|ρ̂i, j |b〉 is only nonzero












and when k  1, we find in Lemma 10 of the Appendix that












where y = 12σ 2 and x = 2σ
2
1+2σ 2 . Now let T denote the differ-
ence between two encrypted inputs. Let us write T = D + O
in the Fock basis, where D is the diagonal of T . From this
decomposition of T , we will obtain an upper bound on the
trace norm of T . First we prove that the trace norm of D is
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We can use this fact to show in Lemma 7 of the Appendix that
‖ρ̂i+1,i+1 − ρ̂i,i‖1  2iσ−2 for σ 2  2, from which it follows
from a telescoping sum that trace-distance between any pair
of encrypted Fock states is at most 2n−1nσ−2. Next, we upper
bound the trace norm of O. To see this, note that the Gersgorin
circle theorem [21] implies that ‖O‖1 is at most the sum of
the absolute values of all its matrix elements. By applying a
summation of Eq. (19) over the indices a and k and by doing
the summation in a first, we can use simple binomial identities
to find that ‖O‖1  8(n + 1)σ−2. Together, with the triangle
inequality on the trace norm of D + O, this allows us to show
that the trace-distance between arbitrary encrypted states with












+ 4(n + 1)
)
, (21)
which asymptotes to zero for large maximum coherent am-
plitudes in the encoding operations. This thereby proves
theorem 1.
When the client Alice has as her input to the scheme a
separable state on m modes, where each mode has at most
n photons, it is easy to see using a telescoping bound on the
modes that the trace-distance between arbitrary multi-mode
separable states is at most m times of the value in (21).
Coherent states with mean photon number of up to 108 can
be easily generated in a cavity mode of a pumped laser [22,
Sec. 4.1]. Since the intensity of a laser can be attenuated with
an variable attenuator, this corresponds to having |α| value
that ranges between 0 and 104, which allows one to create
random displacements with σ = 104. If each mode has at most
15 photons, then using (19), we find that the trace-distance
between arbitrary encrypted states on a single mode is at most
6.8×10−7.
V. ADAPTIVE LINEAR OPTICS
Thus far, we have exclusively considered passive linear op-
tics, where there is no measurement or feedforward. However,
feedforward—the ability to measure a subset of the optical
modes, and use the measurement outcome to dynamically
control the subsequent linear optics network—is an essen-
tial ingredient in many linear optics quantum information
processing protocols. For example, when employing single-
photon encodings for qubits, it is well known that universal
quantum computing is possible with the addition of fast-
feedforward [23], which is known to require nonlinearity [24].
On the other hand, it is strongly believed that without non-
linearity such as feedforward, such schemes cannot be made
universal [24].
Let us understand intuitively how feedforward and non-
linearities can enable two different notions of universality in
quantum optical computing. The first notion is CV univer-
sality [19], where Braunstein and Lloyd show using Baker-
Campbell-Hausdorff arguments how one can in principle im-
plement Hamiltonian evolutions that are arbitrary polynomials
of quadrature operators. To achieve this notion of CV uni-
versality, it suffices to implement Gaussian unitaries which
our scheme can handle natively, along with any non-Gaussian
operation which can be achieved using non-linearities. The
second notion of universality is involves DV encoded within
CV states, and achieving universal DV quantum computation.
In this notion of DV universality with CV states, nonlinearities
can help to initialize non-Gaussian states, which are resource
states to be consumed during gate teleportation to produce
a non-Gaussian gates. To perform the gate teleportation, one
entangles the resource state with a target mode where the non-
Gaussian gate is to be computed, and subsequently measures
the resource state. One then applies a Gaussian gate on the
target mode, conditioned on the measurement outcome. For
instance, on a GKP encoding [25], a combination of non-
Gaussian gates with Gaussian gates can be universal, and
such gates can be achieved with feedforward operations with
nonlinearities.
Can we accommodate for fast-feedforward in the
displacement-key homomorphic encryption protocol? Yes, we
can. Without loss of generality, let us imagine that we wish
to measure just one mode and feedforward the measurement
outcome to a subsequent round of linear optics, to be once
again executed by Bob. For server Bob to perform this mea-
surement, he would have to know the appropriate decryption
operator for that mode. However, he does not have this by
virtue of the protocol, and Alice cannot provide it to him, lest
he misuses it to compromise security.
The only avenue to accommodating the feedforward is to
make the protocol interactive. That is, whenever Bob requires
a measurement result, to proceed with the computation he
outsources the measurement of that mode back to Alice, who
returns to him a classical result. This does not undermine
the viability of the protocol, since Alice is already assumed
to have the ability to apply decoding operations, which are
by definition separable and can therefore be performed on a
per-mode basis.
It is clear that any computation requiring feedforward
will necessarily require turning the encryption protocol into
an interactive one between Alice and Bob. While this is
undesirable, it is to be expected given that no-go proofs
have been provided against universal, non-interactive, fully
homomorphic protocols [9,26,27].
VI. ROBUSTNESS
One might wonder how the robustness of our
displacement-key encoding scheme to noise compares with
the robustness of phase-key and polarization key encoding
schemes. In short, because the demands on the structure of the
input states of the client Alice is relatively mild, she can use
bosonic quantum codes on a single mode [25,28]. If Alice uses
GKP states [25], so that small imperfections in displacements
can be be corrected while the large random displacements
can still obfuscate her data from Bob. To constrain the
photon number per mode, one can use approximate versions
[29] of GKP states. In contrast, bosonic quantum coding
schemes are not immediately compatible with the previous
phase-key [8] and polarization-key schemes [4]. For the
polarization-key encoding which encrypts boson sampling,
without quantum error correction, simulating boson sampling
classically remains classically hard with very little noise [30]
but becomes classically simulable when there is too much
noise [31]. The phase-key scheme [8] is only robust to loss
errors when the computed states remains entirely classical
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and becomes vulnerable to loss errors once they become
entangled into cat states.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a technique for homomorphic encryp-
tion of almost arbitrary optical states under the evolution of
linear optics. The scheme requires only separable displace-
ment operations for encoding and decoding, yet provides
perfect secrecy in the limit of large displacement amplitudes.
For passive linear optics, the protocol requires no client/server
interaction, remaining entirely passive. For adaptive linear
optics, an interactive protocol is required. The technology for
implementing the encoding scheme is readily available today,
making near-term demonstration of elementary encrypted op-
tical quantum computation viable.
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Define the Hermite polynomials as






and the corresponding Hermite functions as





2. The action of a displacement operator on a position eigenstate
The displacement operator can be written as
D(α) = exp(αâ† − α∗â), (A3)
where α = u + iv is a complex number, with u, v ∈ R. Now
the position and momentum operators which admit repre-
sentations as x and 1i
d
dx respectively can also be written as
dimensionless quadratures X1 and X2 respectively which can
be related to the ladder operators via the equalities
a = 1√
2
(X̂2 − iX̂1), a† = 1√
2
(X̂2 + iX̂1), (A4)
which implies that X̂1 = 1√2 (â† − â) and X̂2 = 1i√2 (â† − â),
respectively. Then
[X̂1, X̂2] = 1
2i
[â† + â, â† − â]
= 1
2i
([â†, â† − â] + [â, â† − â])
= 1
2i





Since [X̂1, X̂2] = i the dimensionless quadrature operators X̂1
and X̂2 indeed satisfy the canonical commutation relations.
We then write the displacement operator in terms of the



















= exp((α − α∗)X̂1/
√













Now recall that the BCH formula for operators A, B whose
commutator is proportional to the identity operator is




















Now let |x〉1 denote an eigenstate of the quadrature operator
X̂1 with eigenvalue x, so that X̂1|x〉1 = x|x〉1. Then it is clear
that eiθX1 |x〉1 = eiθx|x〉1. The position eigenstate can be writ-







where |p〉2 denotes an eigenstate of the second quadrature
operator X̂2 with eigenvalues p. Hence















= |x − θ〉1. (A9)
Hence it follows that
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APPENDIX B: REPRESENTATION OF THE ENCRYPTED STATE
Lemma 2. Let |ψ〉 = ∑ni=0 λi|i〉 for any λi ∈ C such that 〈ψ |ψ〉 = 1. Let E be the encryption operation that randomly
displaces with a complex number u + iv, where u and v are chosen independently from normal distributions with mean 0
























2(x−y)2ψi(x)ψ j (y)|x + u〉〈y + u|. (B1)




















dx2 ψi(x1)ψ j (x2)|x1〉〈x2|. (B3)
Then for real u and v, we get











































































iv(x1−x2 )ψi(x1)ψ j (x2)|x1 + u〉〈x2 + u|. (B5)
























2(x1−x2 )2ψi(x1)ψ j (x2)|x1 + u〉〈x2 + u|. (B6)
Simplifying the above and relabeling the variables in the integration then gives the result. 
APPENDIX C: INTEGRALS OF PRODUCTS OF HERMITE POLYNOMIALS
The following lemma gives a bound for the exponential suppression of a certain integral of products of Hermite polynomials in
the orders of the some of the Hermite polynomials. The key tools used here are generating functions for the Hermite polynomials,
and this leads to a significant improvement of bounding the absolute value of the integral of product of Hermite functions over
that in Ref. [32].
Now let us define the integral
























j Ia,b,i, j . (C2)
If we encrypt another state of the form
∑n














j − μiμ∗j )Ia,b,i, j . (C3)
Define ρ̂i = E (|i〉〈i|), and define ρ̂i, j = E (|i〉〈 j|). Then
〈a|ρ̂i, j |b〉 = Ia,b,i, j . (C4)
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Clearly for ρ = ∑i, j λiλ∗j |i〉〈 j|, by linearity of the encryption operation,





j ρ̂i, j . (C5)
We use the method of generating functions to evaluate the exact form for the integral Ia,b,i, j .
Lemma 3. Let a, b, i, j be non-negative integers and σ > 0. Let x = 2σ 21+2σ 2 and y = 1/(2σ 2). Then
〈a|ρ̂i, j |b〉 = Ia,b,i, j = 1
1 + 2σ 2
∑
i1, i2, i3, i4  0
i1 + i2 = a
i1 + i3 = b
i2 + i4 = i















xa+b+i+ j . (C6)
Proof. Let I = Ia,b,i, j . The generating function of the Hermite polynomial is given by






Hence, using the notation [t n] f (t ) to denote the coefficient of t n in an analytical function f (t ), we get
Hn(x) = [t n] exp(2xt − t2)n!. (C8)
Recall that















































×e−(x+u)2/2+2(x+u) f − f 2 e−(y+u)2/2+2(y+u)g−g2 . (C11)
















where α = 1/(1 + 2σ 2) and
F = [sit j f agb] exp[α(4 f gσ 2 + 2 f s + 2gt + 4stσ 2)]. (C14)
By writing the exponential in F as a product of four exponentials and using the Taylor series expansion for each, we have
F = [sit j f agb]eα4 f gσ 2 eα2 f seα2gt eα4stσ 2 = [sit j f agb]
∑
i1,i2,i3,i40
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By extracting the coefficients, we get
F =
∑
i1, i2, i3, i4  0
i1 + i2 = a
i1 + i3 = b
i2 + i4 = i











i1, i2, i3, i4  0
i1 + i2 = a
i1 + i3 = b
i2 + i4 = i












i1, i2, i3, i4  0
i1 + i2 = a
i1 + i3 = b
i2 + i4 = i




Clearly, i1 + i2 + i3 + i4 = a+b+i+ j2 . Thus
F =
∑
i1, i2, i3, i4  0
i1 + i2 = a
i1 + i3 = b
i2 + i4 = i






i1, i2, i3, i4  0
i1 + i2 = a
i1 + i3 = b
i2 + i4 = i







(1 + 2σ 2)a+b+i+ j (C17)
for α = 1/(1 + 2σ 2). Note that
F =
∑
i1, i2, i3, i4  0
i1 + i2 = a
i1 + i3 = b
i2 + i4 = i







1 + 2σ 2
)a+b+i+ j
. (C18)
Now note that i1 = a − i2, i1 = b − i3, i4 = i − i2, and i4 = j − i3, which implies that
i1!i2!i3!i4! =
√























Making appropriate substitutions then completes the proof. 
APPENDIX D: TOWARDS THE PROOF OF THE INDISTINGUISHABILITY BOUND
The key result that we rely on is the result from Lemma 3 which gives an exact form for Ia,b,i, j in terms of y = 1/(2σ 2) and
x = 2σ 21+2σ 2 . Now let b = a + k for k  0. Then observe that Ia,b,i, j = 0 unless j = i + k. Hence we restrict our attention to this
case. Then we have
Ia,a+k,i,i+k = 1

















To see this, Lemma 3. Recall that the subscripts for the summation in Eq. (C6) must satisfy the equalities
i1 + i2 = a, (D2)
i1 + i3 = b, (D3)
i2 + i4 = i, (D4)
i3 + i4 = j. (D5)
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We can then get
(D3) − (D2) : b − a = i3 − i2, (D6)
(D5) − (D4) : j − i = i3 − i2. (D7)
Hence b − a = j − i. So if b = a + k, then (a + k) − a = j − i which implies that k = j − i and hence j = i + k. Hence
whenever j = i + k, there will be nothing in the summation of (C6) to sum over, and the summation in that case evaluates
to zero.
Before we proceed, we provide the proofs of several simple but useful technical lemmas. The first technical lemma we need
is the following combinatorial identity.






Proof. First note that by relabeling the index for the summation, the sum in the lemma is equal to 1k!
∑
a0 x
a+k (a + k) . . . (a +










Simplifying this using the fact that 1 − xk = (1 − x)(1 + · · · + xk+1) yields the result. 
The next technical lemma we need also involves binomial coefficients.
Lemma 5. Let x = (2σ 2)/(1 + 2σ 2), and let i and k be non-negative integers such that 0  k  i − 1. Then (i + 1k ) − ( ik) =
( ik)(
kx
i−k+1 − 12σ 2+1 ).


















x + x k







2σ 2 + 1 +
kx
i − k + 1
)
which proves the result.
Note the trivial fact that
∑
k0 x
k = 1 + 2σ 2. Let us consider the case of k = 0 first, which corresponds to i = j. Hence we
consider the nonzero matrix elements of ρ̂i, which are 〈a|ρ̂i|a〉 for a = 0, 1, . . . ,. Notice then that we have
〈a|ρ̂i|a〉 = Ia,a,i,i = 1











We are then in a position to bound the trace distance between ρ̂i+1 and ρ̂i for every integer i. In the lemma that follows, we only
consider positive integer i, because the case of i = 0 has already been shown earlier.
Lemma 6. Let i and a be any non-negative integer. Let x = (2σ 2)/(1 + 2σ 2) and y = 1/(2σ 2) for σ > 0. Then
〈a|ρ̂i+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρ̂i|a〉 = −〈a|ρ̂i|a〉
2σ 2 + 1 +
xa+i+1











Proof. To prove this, we consider two scenarios. In one scenario, a is small in the sense that a  i. In the other scenario,
a > i.
When a  i, using Lemma 5, we have the following:
〈a|ρ̂i+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρ̂i|a〉 = 1










y2i2 xa+i+1 − 1

























i − i2 + 1 −
1
2σ 2 + 1
)
.
Using the expansion for 〈a|ρ̂i|a〉, we then get
〈a|ρ̂i+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρ̂i|a〉 = −〈a|ρ̂i|a〉
2σ 2 + 1 +
1











Now we proceed to consider the case when a > i. Then we can use Lemma 5 again to get
〈a|ρ̂i+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρ̂i|a〉 = 1










y2i2 xa+i+1 − 1

























i − i2 + 1 −
1
2σ 2 + 1
)
+ 1
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Hence we get
〈a|ρ̂i+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρ̂i|a〉 = −〈a|ρ̂i|a〉
2σ 2 + 1 +
1

















2σ 2 + 1 +
1












and the result follows from (D10) and (D11). 
The trace distance between ρ̂i+1 and ρ̂i is suppressed with increasing σ , as we shall now show.
Lemma 7. The trace distance between ρ̂i+1 and ρ̂i is
1
2
‖ρ̂i+1 − ρ̂i‖1  1








Proof. Since ρ̂i+1 and ρ̂i are diagonal matrices in the number basis, we have
‖ρ̂i+1 − ρ̂i‖1 =
∑
a0
|〈a|ρi+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρ̂i|a〉|. (D12)
Using lemma 6 for the exact form of 〈a|ρi+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρ̂i|a〉, we get






































where (ak) = 0 for all k > a. The first summation above is trivial to bound because the trace of a density matrix must be one, so
one must have
∑
a0〈a|ρ̂i|a〉 = 1. For the second summation, we can use Lemma 4 to get
‖ρ̂i+1 − ρ̂i‖1  1
2σ 2 + 1 +
xi+1










Since x/(1 − x) = 2σ 2 = y−1 and 1/(1 − x) = 2σ 2 + 1 for x = (2σ 2)/(1 + 2σ 2), we get
‖ρ̂i+1 − ρ̂i‖1  1














k = y ∑ik=0 ( ik)yk = y(1 + y)i. Thus using the fact that x  1, 12σ 2+1  12σ 2 and y = 1/(2σ 2), we get
‖ρ̂i+1 − ρ̂i‖1  1








and the result follows. 
Clearly then by the telescoping sum, the trace distance between any pair of encrypted diagonal states can be easily bounded.
Lemma 8. Let n be any positive integer, and let i and j be non-negative integers such that i < j  n. Then for σ > 0, the
trace distance between ρ̂i and ρ̂ j is at most
1
2









Proof. One just needs to write (ρ̂i − ρ̂i+1) + · · · + (ρ̂ j−1 − ρ̂ j ). There are at most n such bracketed terms, so using the triangle
inequality with lemma 7 gives
‖ρ̂i − ρ̂ j‖1 = ‖(ρ̂i − ρ̂i+1) + · · · + (ρ̂ j−1 − ρ̂ j )‖1  ‖ρ̂i − ρ̂i+1‖1 + · · · + ‖ρ̂ j−1 − ρ̂ j )‖1  j − i


























This proves the result. 
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We now proceed to obtain a bound on the off-diagonal matrix elements ρi, j . Without loss of generality, assume that j = i + k
for k  0. To analyze this case, we first consider the following technical lemma that is easy to verify.
















Proof. It is easy to see that (ak)(
i















Using Lemma 9 we can arrive derive bounds for the off-diagonal matrix elements ρ̂i, j .
Lemma 10. Let i, k be non-negative integers and let j = i + k. Then for σ > 0,
∑
a0
|〈a|ρ̂i, j |a + k〉| 
(




Proof. Using the exact form for the matrix element 〈a|ρ̂i, j |a + k〉 as given in Lemmas 3 and 9 to bound the binomial
coefficients therein, we get
|〈a|ρ̂i, j |a + k〉|  1











where y = 1/(2σ 2) and x = (2σ 2)/(1 + 2σ 2). Using Lemma 3 again, we get
|〈a|ρ̂i, j |a + k〉|  (y/x)k〈a + k|ρ̂i+k|a + k〉. (D22)
Using the fact that ρ̂i+k has unit trace, we easily get
∑





We are now ready to prove the main result.
Proof of Theorem 1. First we prove that without loss of
generality, we can let the any two input states to our scheme
ρ and ρ ′ be pure states. Now consider the case where ρ and





p j |φ j〉〈φ j |, ρ ′ =
∑
j1
p′j |φ′j〉〈φ′j |, (D23)
such that p j = p′j for every j  1. In this decomposition, the
states |φ j〉 and |φk〉 need not be distinct even when j = k.
Similarly, |φ′j〉 and |φ′k〉 need not be distinct even when j = k.
Here, we must have pj to be non-negative and
∑
j1 p j = 1.
Then we use the linearity of the quantum channel E to see that
E (ρ) − E (ρ ′) =
∑
j1
p j (E (|φ j〉〈φ j |) − E (|φ′j〉〈φ′j |)). (D24)
Applying the triangle inequality for the trace norm, we get
‖E (ρ) − E (ρ ′)‖1 
∑
j1
p j‖E (|φ j〉〈φ j |) − E (|φ′j〉〈φ′j |)‖1.
(D25)
It hence follows that
‖E (ρ) − E (ρ ′)‖1  max
j1
‖E (|φ j〉〈φ j |) − E (|φ′j〉〈φ′j |)‖1.
(D26)
From (D26), we can see that we can maximize over the trace
distance between encrypted pure states to maximize ‖E (ρ) −
E (ρ ′)‖1. It thus suffices to consider ρ = |φ〉〈φ| and ρ ′ =
|φ′〉〈φ′| to be pure states in this security proof, where |φ〉 =∑
i0 λi|i〉 and |φ′〉 =
∑
i0 μi|i〉. We make this assumption
with loss of generality in the remainder of this proof.
Consider the matrix









j − μiμ∗j )Ia,b,i, j |a〉〈b|.
(D27)
Now let D be the diagonal component of T and O be the off-
diagonal component of T . By the triangle inequality, we will
have ‖T ‖1 = ‖D + O‖1  ‖D‖1 + ‖O‖1. We now proceed to
bound the diagonal component.








j − μiμ∗j )Ia,a,i, j |a〉〈b|. (D28)
Using Lemma 3, we know that Ia,b,i, j = 0 whenever i = j.












(|λi|2 − |μi|2)〈a|ρ̂i|a〉. (D29)
Hence it follows that
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Since ω and ω′ are mixed states that are diagonal in the Fock
basis, we can use (D26) to see that
‖D‖1  max
0i< jn












For the off-diagonal elements we can use the Gersgorin
Circle Theorem (GCT). First, note that for any i and j,
|λiλ∗j − μiμ∗j |  2. From the GCT the 1-norm of O is at most





















j − μiμ∗j )Ia+k,a,i, j |a + k〉〈a|
(D34)
































(|Ia,a+k,i, j | + |Ia+k,a,i, j |), (D35)
where we have used the triangle inequality in the second
inequality above. Using the fact that Ia,a+k,i, j is only non-zero






(|Ia,a+k,i,i+k| + |Ia+k,a,i+k,i|). (D36)








Using Lemma 10 with σ 2 > 0 for the geometric sum,





−2k  4(n+1)σ−21−σ−2 
8(n + 1)σ−2. The result then follows. 
APPENDIX E: MULTIMODE SECURITY
The security of our scheme on multiple modes arises from
a telescoping sum on the modes, when the multimode state
is a separable state. To see this explicitly, let the encryption
operator on m modes be E . Because the random displacements
are chosen independently for every mode, we have
E = E1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Em,
where E j denotes an encryption operator on the jth mode.
Now let I denote the identity channel on a single mode. Then
for any two m-mode states ρ = ρ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρm and τ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗
τm with a tensor product structure, we can write
(E1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Em)(ρ) − (E1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Em)(τ )E1(ρ1)
⊗ · · · ⊗ Em(ρm) − E1(τ1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Em(τm)
= A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Am − B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bm, (E1)
where Aj = E j (ρ j ) and Bj = E j (τ j ). Using the telescoping
sum, we have
A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Am − B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bm
= (A1 ⊗ A2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Am − B1 ⊗ A2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Am)
+ (B1 ⊗ A2 ⊗ A3 · · · ⊗ Am
− B1 ⊗ B2 ⊗ A3 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Am) + . . .
+(B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bm−1 ⊗ Am − B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bm). (E2)
By applying the triangle inequality for the trace norm of each
of the above bracketed terms, then we get
‖A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Am − B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bm‖1
 ‖(A1 ⊗ A2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Am
− B1 ⊗ A2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Am)‖1
+‖(B1 ⊗ A2 ⊗ A3 · · · ⊗ Am
− B1 ⊗ B2 ⊗ A3 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Am)‖1
+ · · · + ‖(B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bm−1 ⊗ Am
− B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bm)‖1. (E3)
Using the multiplicativity of the trace norm under the tensor
product and the fact that every quantum state has a trace norm
equal to one so that ‖Aj‖1 = ‖Bj‖1, we find that





If every single mode state ρ j and τ j have at most n photons,
and every mode is randomly displaced independently with
displacement vector taken from a complex Gaussian distri-
bution of standard deviation σ and mean 0, using the above
inequality, we can see that the trace distance between the
encrypted states A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Am and B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bm is simply
at most m times of the trace distance between arbitrary
displacement-encrypted single mode states with at most n
photons.
APPENDIX F: BOUNDED PHOTON NUMBER
AND BOUNDED ENERGY
In this section, we prove that a quantum state with bounded
expected energy is well approximated by a quantum state
with a bounded number of photons. Using n̂ = ∑n0 n|n〉〈n|
to denote the number operator, the expected energy of an
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First we prove a lemma that reduces the problem of bounding
the trace-norm of the difference of density matrices to evaluat-
ing bounds on Euclidean norms, which is reminiscent of [33,
Lemma 2].
Lemma 11. Let ρ = ∑ j p j |φ j〉〈φ j | and ρ ′ = ∑ j p j |φ′j〉
〈φ′j | be density operators. Furthermore, let |ε j〉 = |φ′j〉 − |φ j〉.
Then




√〈ε j |ε j〉 + 〈ε j |ε j〉). (F2)
Proof. By definition, |φ′j〉 = |φ j〉 + |ε j〉. Hence,
|φ′j〉〈φ′j | − |φ j〉〈φ j | = |φ j〉〈ε j | + |ε j〉〈φ j | + |ε j〉〈ε j |. (F3)
By the triangle inequality, we have
‖|φ j〉〈ε j | + |ε j〉〈φ j | + |ε j〉〈ε j |‖1
 ‖|φ j〉〈ε j |‖1 + ‖|ε j〉〈φ j |‖1 + ‖|ε j〉〈ε j |‖1. (F4)
Now we use the definition of the trace norm where for
any operator A, we have ‖A‖1 = maxU {Tr(AU ) : ‖U‖∞  1}
where ‖U‖∞ denotes the maximum singular value of U . For
Hermitian operators, it suffices to consider the maximization
of U over unitary operators. For ‖|ε j〉〈ε j |‖1, the optimal U is
just the identity operator, and hence ‖|ε j〉| < ε j |‖1 = 〈ε j |ε j〉.
To evaluate ‖|ε j〉〈φ j |‖1, consider the unitary operator U that
swaps the normalized states |ε j〉/
√〈ε j |ε j〉 and |φ j〉. Then we
can see ‖|ε j〉〈φ j |‖1 = 〈ε j |ε j〉/
√〈ε j |ε j〉. A similar argument
applies for evaluating ‖|φ j〉〈ε j |‖1, and the result follows. 
Now we present a lemma regarding approximating a pure
state with another pure state that has at most n photons.
Lemma 12. Let |φ〉 be any pure state supported on the Fock
basis that has expected energy μ. Let n be an integer such that
n  μ. Then there exists a state |ψ〉 that has at most n photons
and ‖|φ〉 − |ψ〉‖  2√μ/n.
Proof. In the Fock basis, we have |φ〉 = ∑∞j=0 λ j | j〉 where
λ j are complex numbers and
∑∞
j=0 |λ j |2 = 1. Now consider
|ψ〉 = ∑nj=0 λ j | j〉 + x|n + 1〉 for some complex number x
such that |x|2 = 1 − ∑nj=0 |λ j |2. Hence it follows from the
triangle inequality that
‖|ψ〉 − |φ〉‖ = ‖|ε〉 − x|n + 1〉‖  ‖|ε〉‖ + ‖x|n + 1〉‖,
(F5)








‖|ψ〉 − |φ〉‖  2|x|. (F7)
Now let X denote a random variable that is equal to j with
probability |λ j |2. It then follows that
Pr[X  n + 1] = |x|2. (F8)




j|λ j |2 = μ. (F9)
Since X is a non-negative random variable, we can use
Markov’s inequality, so that for any real number b such that
b  1, we have
Pr[X  bμ]  1
b
. (F10)
Since n  μ, we have
Pr[X  n + 1]  μ
n
. (F11)
Hence it follows that
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